Being an insidious risk to construction projects, collusion has attracted extensive attention from numerous researchers around the world. However, little effort has ever been made to assess collusion, which is important and necessary for curbing collusion in construction projects. Specific to the context of China, this paper developed an artificial neural network model to assess collusion risk in construction projects. Based on a comprehensive literature review, a total of 22 specific collusive practices were identified first, and then refined by a two-round Delphi interview with 15 experienced experts. Subsequently, using the consolidated framework of collusive practices, a questionnaire was further developed and disseminated, which received 97 valid replies. The questionnaire data were then utilized to develop and validate the collusion risk assessment model with the facilitation of artificial neural network approach. The developed model was finally applied in a real-life metro project in which its reliability and applicability were both verified. Although the model was developed under the context of Chinese construction projects, its developing strategy can be applied in other countries, especially for those emerging economies that have a significant concern of collusion in their construction sectors, and thus contributing to the global body of knowledge of collusion.
Introduction
Collusion has been defined as a set of behaviours where competitors coordinate their market behaviour surreptitiously, which is contrary to the principles of free competition (Chotibhongs, Arditi 2012a Zarkada-Fraser 2000) . Early in the 1980s, collusion has already been recognized as a basic area that is worthy of working on (Carr, Maloney 1983) . Since then, considerable efforts were devoted to this area in various countries worldwide (Le, Shan 2014) , such as Australia (Ray et al. 1999; Vee, Skitmore 2003) , India (Tabish, Jha 2011) , South Africa (Bowen et al. 2007a (Bowen et al. , 2007b , Turkey (Gunduz, Önder 2013) and Nigeria (Alutu 2007; Alutu, Udhawuve 2009; Ameh, Odusami 2010) . Collusion has sabotaged the construction industry significantly (Vee, Skitmore 2003; Shan et al. 2017) . It can not only result in a decrease in bidder numbers and an increase in contract price (Ray et al. 1999; Zarkada-Fraser 2000; Ballesteros-Pérez et al. 2013) , but also trigger other unethical behaviours those may lead to quality failures in construction projects (Le, Shan 2014) . According to Le et al. (2014a) and Bowen et al. (2007a Bowen et al. ( , 2007b , collusion has been identified as a significant form of corruption in construction projects that could be encountered in entire construction period, from project conception phase to post implementation phase.
In the past three decades, the Chinese construction sector achieved a rapid development and had become a significant section to the global construction market. However, due to the imperfect legislation and administration systems, China faces a severe challenge of coping with collusive practices in construction projects currently (Zou 2006; Le et al. 2014a; Shan et al. 2015a Shan et al. , 2015b . Collusive practices have spread so extensively that they have been detected from numerous construction projects, from the small ones estimating CNY 3 million (approximately USD 0.47 million) (Xinhua Net 2015), to the national-level public project such as The Three Gorges Dam (Xinhua Net 2014) . According to the National Bureau of Corruption Prevention of China (2011) , the number of collusion cases in the construction sector between 2007 and 2009 was 13,006, accounting for nearly 44% of all the business bribery cases (29,600) occurred in that period. These reports and statistics have indicated an urgent situation of collusion in the Chinese construction industry.
Current literature reveal that existing collusion research mainly distribute in areas such as identification of collusive practices (Ray et al. 1999; Alutu 2007; Alutu, Udhawuve 2009; Ameh, Odusami 2010; Tabish, Jha 2011) , investigation of consequences of collusion (Ika 2012) , exploration of factors contributing to collusion (Zarkada-Fraser 2000) , detection of collusion (Chotibhongs, Arditi 2012a Ballesteros-Pérez et al. 2013) , and collusion prevention strategies (Sichombo et al. 2009 ).However, little has been done on collusion assessment, which is definitely crucial for anti-collusion affairs. In addition, according to literature search, particular research on collusion in Chinese construction projects remains lacking as well. Therefore, this study aims to: (1) identify the collusive practices in Chinese construction projects, and (2) apply the identified collusive practices to advance a model to assess collusion risks in Chinese construction projects.
To achieve the aims, this study employed a combined research approach that contains both qualitative and quantitative methods, as suggested by Hon et al. (2012) . First, a systematic literature review was conducted to identify collusive practices in construction proj-ects. Second, a two-round Delphi interview was performed to refine the identified collusive practices under the context of Chinese construction projects. Third, according to the Delphi interview results, a questionnaire was developed and disseminated among industry practitioners to collect their opinion-based data. Finally, artificial neural network (ANN) was adopted to develop the assessment model.
Methodology

Literature review
To identify collusive practices in construction projects, a comprehensive and systematic literature review was conducted. The targets for the literature search contained journal papers, books, reports, news and documents that have discussed the collusion issues in construction projects. Particularly, the search for journal papers followed the popular search strategy advocated by Le et al. (2014b) , Yi and Chan (2014) , and Hu et al. (2015) 
Delphi interview
The Delphi method is a structured communication and consensus building approach amongst a group of experts on a complex problem, which has been widely adopted in construction engineering and management research (Hallowell, Gambatese 2009; Hon et al. 2012; Xia, Chan 2012a Ameyaw et al. 2016) . Considering that the identified collusive practices are all from literature, a two-round Delphi interview was thus conducted with Chinese industry experts to fit these collusive practices in the context of China. A total of 15 experts that possess at least ten years of experience in the Chinese construction sector and management experience related to tendering were targeted and invited to the Delphi interview. Table 1 shows the profile of the expert panel. It could be noted that all the experts possess senior positions in their institutions and have sufficient work experience. Additionally, diversified professional backgrounds (i.e. client, consultant, contractor, designer, supplier, and academia) of these experts also help raise the heterogeneity of the Delphi panel and thus enhance the quality of interview (Ameyaw et al. 2016) . In the first round Delphi interview, experts were demanded to evaluate the occurrence probability of each identified collusive practice in the context of Chinese construction projects, in accordance with a five-point rating scale (i.e. 5 = very common, 4 = common, 3 = medium, 2 = few, and 1= very few). Meanwhile, experts were also encouraged to list any new collusive practices based on their experiences. Mean value of each collusive practice was computed and then fed back to the Delphi panel.
In the second round Delphi interview, experts were requested to re-assess their evaluations in light of the results of the first round interview. A cut-off criterion of 3.0 points was adopted to trim the identified collusive practices, as recommended by Jamieson (2004) . To check if significant difference exists in experts of different professional backgrounds, the Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted as recommended by Hon et al. (2012) and Ameyaw et al. (2016) .
Questionnaire
Questionnaire is a competent tool used to gauge people's perceptions of a subject, and it has been widely used in previous collusion studies (Zarkada-Fraser 2000; Zarkada-Fraser, Skitmore 2000) . Hence, this study also used the questionnaire to collect data. An anonymous online questionnaire was developed based on the Delphi interview results. To maximize the number of potential respondents for the questionnaire, a number of governmental departments, enterprises, and research institutions, were contacted. A total of 12 institutions agreed to facilitate the questionnaire, and these institutions comprise two governmental departments, three clients, two contractors, one construction consultants' association, two designers, one supplier, and one research institution. All of these institutions are typical and active players in the Chinese construction sector and can provide numerous qualified potential respondents for the questionnaire.
The questionnaire included three parts as follows. Part A solicited personal information from each respondent. In Part B, according to his/her experience in a typical project, the respondents were requested to assess the probability and severity of each collusive practice using a five-point rating scale ("1" represents for the least probability and severity, "5" represents for the highest probability and severity). Such a measuring approach is recommended by Shen et al. (2001) , Molenaar (2005) , Zou and Zhang (2009) , Ke et al. (2011), Hwang and Ng (2015) , and Hwang et al. (2016) in their risk evaluation studies which is similar to the evaluation of collusive practices in this study. In Part C, each respondent was requested to indicate a holistic perception of collusion risk to his/her project, using a scale of 0-100%. The use of 0-100% scale was due to the subsequently adopted ANN activation function of logsig, for which the output ranges from 0 to 1 (Hussain et al. 2010) . A series of statistical analysis techniques, including Cronbach's alpha, one-sample t-test, and independent samples t-test were also employed to test the collected data.
Artificial Neural Network
Artificial Neural Network is an information processing approach which imitates the nervous system of human brain, and is used to estimate or approximate unknown functions depending on diverse inputs (Samarasinghe 2007; Goh, Chua 2013) . ANN has been widely adopted in construction engineering and management research. This approach has been utilized to examine topics such as construction safety (Goh, Chua 2013; Patel, Jha 2015a Goh, Binte Sa' Adon 2015) , project success Cheng et al. 2010; Wang, Gibson Jr. 2010; Cheng et al. 2012) , performance management (Georgy et al. 2005; Cheung et al. 2006; Jha, Chockalingam 2011; Cheng et al. 2011 ), risk management (Al-Sobiei et al. 2005 Jin, Zhang 2011) , project dispute resolution (Cheung et al. 2000) , and organizational effectiveness (Dikmen et al. 2005) . ANN has received such a wide application because it is a data-driven and self-adaptive method that is particularly suitable for real-world problem solving, especially for those of non-linear, distributed, parallel and local processing natures (Boussabaine 1996) . For its various functions, ANN can be used for risk analysis, decision making, resource optimization, prediction, and classification (Moselhi et al. 1991; Boussabaine 1996; Patel, Jha 2015b) . Comparing with conventional regression models, ANN has been strongly recommended for its capability of predicting outcomes more accurately (Rumelhart et al. 1994; Wang, Gibson Jr. 2010; Patel, Jha 2015b) . Given collusion is a complicated topic which is full of uncertainty, ANN is an appropriate and competent method to develop a model that is dedicated for the assessment of collusion risks in construction projects.
For the network architecture of the model, this study adopted a commonly used multi-layered feed-forward network and used back-propagation algorithm to train the network, as suggested by Patel and Jha (2015b) . Specifically, the Levenberg-Marquardt back-propagation learning algorithm was adopted for training. It was selected because it can acquire a lower mean square error (MSE) than other algorithms for function approximate problems, and can help prevent over-fitting problems (Demuth, Beale 2000; Patel, Jha 2015a . The common used logsig function was selected as activation function (Hussain et al. 2010) , and the one-hidden-layer was utilized as it is enough for assessment purposes (Zhang et al. 1998) . The inputs of the model were the respondents' evaluations of collusive practices, while the outputs of the model were the respondents' perceptions of collusion risks in their evaluated projects. The training, validating, and testing of the network was conducted with the aid of MATLAB NN toolbox.
Results
Identification of collusive practices
A total of 20 papers those investigated collusive practices were spotted from the literature search. Additionally, two noted and useful Organization for Economic Co-operation and (OECD 2009 ), were also targeted as the sources of collusive practices. After going through these journal papers and two OECD documents, 22 specific collusive practices were identified. Based on their initiators and the different project phases, the identified collusive practices were categorized into four groups, namely, client related collusive practices in bidding, contractor related collusive practices in bidding, contractor related collusive practices in project construction, and supplier related collusive practices.
Development (OECD) documents, namely the Recommendation of the OECD Council on Fighting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement (OECD 2012) and Guidelines for Fighting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement
Client related collusive practices in bidding. In fact, many collusive practices in project bidding phase are initiated by clients. For instance, clients may publish an inadequate advertising of tender and set very short bid periods so that only companies notified illegally have sufficient time to produce solid bids (de Jong et al. 2009 ). Clients may misuse prequalification requirements to preclude qualified companies from candidate lists and only allow their favoured companies to contend (Lo et al. 1999) ; divulge vital tender information to their preferred tenderers (Vee, Skitmore 2003; Sichombo et al. 2009 ); hint tenderers to inflate tender price by a pre-arranged amount in return for kickbacks (Sichombo et al. 2009; de Jong et al. 2009 ); and provide biased evaluations to their favoured contractors (Tabish, Jha 2011) . In some extreme cases, clients pre-select companies and then call tenders to fulfil organizational or statutory requirements (Bowen et al. 2012) , or even award contracts to their preferred companies illegally without an execution of a tendering procedure which iscompulsory (Alutu 2007; Alutu, Udhawuve 2009; Tabish, Jha 2011) .
Contractor related collusive practices in bidding. The most common collusive practice of contractors in bidding is that contractors collude on pricing for projects, either by escalating construction costs, or by creating a situation in which contractors win contracts because of a pre-planned sequence rather than they offer the best price (Priemus 2004; Dorée 2004; Hartley 2009; Sichombo et al. 2009 ). Also, withdrawal from bidding process is a typical type of collusive practice, in which a collusive agreement is reached that the tenderer providing the most competitive price gives up the contract so that the pre-established tenderer can win the contract (Zarkada-Fraser, Skitmore 2000). Besides, an unqualified contractor may use the name of a qualified contractor to bid for projects, and this case is especially common in projects that are of small size (Lo et al. 1999) . In addition, a contractor may bribe the bidding consultant to obtain vital information of its competitors (Bowen et al. 2007a) , and bribe the tender evaluation panel to seek for illegal competitive advantages in bidding (Zou 2006; Tabish, Jha 2011) .
Contractor related collusive practices in project construction. Contractors should be responsible for the majority of collusive practices during project construction. For example, under collusive agreements with contractors, the site supervisor might ignore the slow implementation of projects, unfulfilled contract requirements, the use of incomplete and low quality materials, and some other malpractices conducted by contractors (Alutu 2007) . Having received illegal benefits from contractors, quantity surveyors may issue completion certificates falsely, even when jobs are incomplete or sometimes abandoned. The quantity surveyors might also help contractors blow the cost of construction changes; and fluctuate the prices of work items (Alutu, Udhawuve 2009; Sichombo et al. 2009; Ameh, Odusami 2010; Tabish, Jha 2011) . To get extra profits from construction changes, contractors may bribe designers and ask for unnecessary design change orders (Sohail, Cavill 2008) . Additionally, staff members from the client may actively approve those change orders so that he/she could expect kickbacks from the contractor (de Jong et al. 2009 ).
Supplier related collusive practices. Suppliers also play a shameful role in collusive practices in construction projects. A supplier may bribe the client staff to get it nominated as the supplier of the project (Bowen et al. 2007a) . Suppliers can even manipulate the project design to benefit themselves. For instance, the design may be over specified to a particular supplier so that other suppliers are excluded (Bowen et al. 2007a; Ameh, Odusami 2010) . In addition, the project can also be over designed to increase the collusive earnings for the engineer and supplier (Ameh, Odusami 2010) . According to the collusive agreement between the supplier and contractor, those inferior construction materials may be provided and used favourably (Sichombo et al. 2009 ). In addition, the quantity and quality of construction materials may also be compromised due to the connivance among the client, quantity surveyor and suppliers, thus, the illegal profits incurred would be shared at an agreed percentage (Sohail, Cavill 2008; Ameh, Odusami 2010) . Table 2 shows the identified collusive practices, their definitions, categorizations, as well as their sources. These collusive practices could be regarded as indicators to collusion risks and thus could be utilized to assess collusion risks. Table 3 shows the results of the Delphi interview. According to the feedbacks from the first round Delphi interview, no additional collusive practice was supplemented by the expert panel. Meanwhile, results from the second round Delphi interview indicated that the lack of publicity (CP1.7) and insufficient tender time (CP1.8) received evaluations below the cut-off criterion of 3.0 points, and thus were deleted from the list of collusive practices. Such results revealed that the Delphi panel considered the current publicity and tender time of most tenders in the Chinese context to be adequate. This maybe because the legislative body in China has issued The Bidding & Tendering Law of People's Republic of China, which stipulated a series of specific and compulsory regulations on the least level of publicity and tender time (The National People's Congress of People's Republic of China 1999), and that the majority of industry practitioners followed these regulations. In addition, the KruskalWallis test result shows that the asymptotic significance value of each collusive practice is higher than 0.05, indicating that there is no significant difference among experts of different backgrounds (Hon et al. 2012; Ameyaw et al. 2016) . Thus, a total of 20 collusive practices in Chinese construction projects were finally consolidated for this study.
Delphi interview
Questionnaire
A total of 108 replies were received from the questionnaire. After a careful visual examination, 11 replies were found to be inappropriately filled out, and thus were excluded. Therefore, a total of 97 valid replies were obtained. Table 4 shows respondents' backgrounds. The respondents were from diverse employers such as client, contractor, designer, consultant, Table 2 supplier, and academic institutions. More than 70% of them possessed six years of experience or above in the Chinese public construction sector. More than 80% of them occupied middle managerial positions or above in their institutions. Such a panel of respondents is believed to be sufficiently experienced to provide reliable evaluations on the collusive practices.
End of
Although the sample size of this study is not large for the adoption of ANN approach, it can be justified by reviewing previous studies in which the ANN approach has been used for running data collected with comparable samples. For instance, Cheung et al. (2000) used 61 samples to build an ANN model to track the factors affecting the dispute resolution in construction projects in Hong Kong; Cheng et al. (2011) used 76 samples to develop a fuzzy hybrid neural network to improve the effectiveness of assessment on subcontractors' performance; Jha and Chockalingam (2011) used 76 samples to establish an ANN model for predicting schedule performance in construction projects of India; and Goh and Binte Sa' Adon (2015) used 40 samples to build an ANN model for exploring the cognitive factors affecting safety behaviour in the Singaporean construction industry. Since reliable findings have all been achieved in these studies, the sample size of this study should be able to satisfy the application of ANN approach in this study. Considering the probability and severity of each collusive practice were evaluated simultaneously in the questionnaire, Formula (1) below was adopted to calculate the significance index of each collusive practice, as suggested by Ke et al. (2011) :
where CP ni.j = the significance index of the jth collusive practice under ith collusive practice group, provided by the nth respondent; CP npi.j = the probability assessment of the jth collusive practice under ith collusive practice group, provided by the nth respondent; and CP nsi.j = the severity assessment of the jth collusive practice under ith collusive practice group, provided by the nth respondent. Table 5 demonstrates the evaluations of 20 collusive practices. The top five collusive practices are misrepresentation of qualification certificates (CP2.2), loose site supervision (CP3.1), misusing prequalification requirements (CP1.1), fake tendering (CP1.4), and approval of the unnecessary change orders (CP3.4). Statistical tests were also conducted with the aid of IBM SPSS Statistics (2013). To test its reliability, the common tool Cronbach's alpha was adopted. In this study, the Cronbach's alpha was 0.935, higher than the threshold of 0.7 (Hwang et al. 2015b) , indicating the evaluations provided by the respondents are reliable. Sig.
Sig.
Sig.
CP1.1 3.94 To test whether each collusive practice has significant impact on Chinese construction projects, the one-sample t-test was carried out as suggested by Zhao et al. (2013a Zhao et al. ( , 2013b Zhao et al. ( , and 2016 , with the test value of 3.00 at the significance level of 0.05. The test results showed that the p-values of all the collusive practices were less than 0.05 (as shown in Table 5 ), suggesting that all the collusive practices have significant impact on Chinese construction projects, and thus were proper for further analysis.
To test if significant difference exists in respondents of different professional backgrounds (i.e. client, contractor, consultant, designer, supplier, and academia), the independent samples t-test was conducted, as suggested by Zhao et al. (2013c) , Hwang et al. (2014 Hwang et al. ( , 2015a , and Gunduz and Yahya (2018) . A confidence level of 95% was adopted in this study. The test results in Table 5 show that significance values of all collusive practices are greater than 0.05, indicating no significant differences among the respondents of different professional backgrounds.
Development of ANN model
Calculations of inputs
Considering that each collusive practice group was comprised of several different collusive practices, and that each collusive practice contributed to the group to different extents, weight for each specific collusive practice was calculated, using the Formula (2) as below:
where W i.j = the weight of the jth collusive practice under ith collusive practice group, MS i.j = the mean score of the jth collusive practice under ith collusive practice group; and k = the number of collusive practices under ith group. The evaluation and weight for each specific collusive practice were shown in Table 5 . Subsequently, a collusive practice group index CPGI was calculated to represent the value of each collusive practice group, using the Formula (3) as below:
where CPGI ni = value of ith collusive practice group, provided by the nth respondent, CP ni.j = value of jth collusive practice under ith collusive practice group, provided by the nth respondent, W i.j = the weight of the jth collusive practice under ith collusive practice group, calculated using Formula 2, and k = the number of collusive practices under ith group. The calculated CPGIs were used as inputs for the ANN model. In addition, data collected in the Part C of the questionnaire (i.e. respondents' perceptions of collusion risks in their evaluated projects), were utilized as outputs for the ANN model.
Training, validating, and testing of network
Before dividing them into training, validating, and testing data sets, the data collected from 97 samples were randomized using NeuroSolutions (2015) . Out of 97 samples, 87 samples were used to develop the model, in which 61 (70%), 13 (15%), and 13 (15%) samples were utilized to train, validate, and test the network, respectively. Such a ratio follows the suggestions of Goh (1995) , Boussabaine (1996) , and Jha and Chockalingam (2011) . The remaining ten samples were reserved to validate the model after it is developed, as suggested by Jha (2015a, 2015b) . According to Berry and Linoff (1997) , the quantity of hidden layer neurons should be no more than twofold of those in the input layer. Therefore, five trials were conducted with the different settings of hidden layer neurons, starting from four to eight. According to Patel and Jha (2015b) , configuration of the network is determined according to the MSE and mean absolute percentage error (MAPE) generated in the processes of training, validating, and testing. According to Figures 1 and 2 , which has plotted MSE and MAPE corresponding to the number of hidden neurons (from four to eight), the hidden layer with five neurons had the least MSE (0.0142) and MAPE (0.204) of all the alternatives. Therefore, the configuration 4-5-1 (number of inputs -number of hidden layer neurons -number of output) of the network was finalized for the model. Figure 3 depicts the configuration of the developed model. 
Validation of the model
To validate the developed model, absolute percentage deviation (APD) was calculated, as suggested by Jha (2015a, 2015b) . APD is an indicator reflecting the prediction accuracy of a forecasting method in statistics, and could be computed by dividing the difference between actual and assessed results using the actual result. Based on the developed 4-5-1 ANN model, data of the remaining ten samples kept in reserve were input MATLAB NN Toolbox to calculate the assessed collusion risks. Based on the assessed and actual results, the APD of each sample was calculated and shown in Table 6 . The obtained APDs ranged between 2.56% and 9.84%. Although there is no unified due threshold on APD, Jha and his co-authors opined less than 10% an acceptable limit (Jha, Chockalingam 2011; Patel, Jha 2015a . Thus, the assessment results of the developed model could be regarded as reliable. 
Model application and discussion
After the model was developed, a metro project in a provincial capital city in Central China was selected for model application. The project was selected because it is a major infrastructure project with an impressive estimated cost of CNY 100 billion (approximately US $ 15.68 billion), which might provide a vast room for the ill-disposed practitioners to perform collusive practices. Before approaching to the project, the research team contacted the local construction authority and briefed them on the study in terms of research purpose, design, methodology, as well as the development of the model. Considering curbing collusive practices is one of its core missions, the local construction authority was ready to facilitate the model application. Four staff members of this institution that have been working on the project were provided the framework of collusive practices and requested to give their corresponding assessments. The collected assessments were then input the developed ANN model to assess the collusion risk in the project, with the aid of MATLAB NN Tool Box. The calculated results for the four staff members were 0.38, 0.43, 0.42, and 0.35 respectively, with an average result of 0.395, indicating the project was not facing a severe collusion risk. The results were feedback to the staff members who believed that the assessed results were reliable as so far they had not detected collusive practices in this project or received any report in this regard. This was probably because the project was an important project to local society, and that the local authority directed considerable attention on it, and thus practitioners of the project would be quite cautious before deciding to conduct collusive practices. Moreover, the model application also implies that the developed model can be more helpful and meaningful if used by an independent third party or the construction authority as under such circumstances the inputs to the model wold be more reliable, and the assessment results would be more accurate accordingly.
Conclusions
Assessing collusion risk can definitely secure the projects' benefits from the insidious harm of collusion, because it can tell people to what extent the potential collusion exists in the project, and thus alert people proactively that corresponding anti-collusion measures should be formulated and implemented. This paper established a comprehensive framework of collusive practices in Chinese construction projects, which consists of 20 specific collusive practices related to all contracting parties. These collusive practices were further categorized into four groups, namely client related collusive practices in bidding, contractor related collusive practices in bidding, contractor related collusive practices in project construction, and supplier related collusive practices. Upon the established framework, this paper developed an ANN model to assess the collusion risks in Chinese construction projects. The model was applied in a real-life metro project, and the assessed results were proved to be reliable by its users. Although the model was developed according to the context of China, this study is believed to be beneficial to the global construction community. First, the framework of collusive practices demonstrated in this study can provide the global construction contractors from developed countries with a better understanding of collusion in those emerging econ-omies like China. Second, the framework of collusive practices in this study can be utilized by some other developing countries to customize the list of collusive practices of their own, so that they can deal with their collusion problem more precisely. Third, the model developing strategy advocated in this study could be replicated in other countries, to facilitate the assessments of collusion in their construction projects. Further the findings of this study could be directed to the identification and evaluation of various anti-collusion strategies implemented in the construction industry. It would also be interesting to explore the attitudes and interactions among different stakeholders before they reach a collusive agreement.
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